In this essay I will be attempting to examine and critically assess the memory/psychological criterion of personal identity. I will begin with the concept of personal identity and work my way through the different criteria for it. This will lead to the psychological theory and what problems there are with it, the bodily and substance theories and the problems with them, and how I believe these problems can be somewhat resolved by synthesising criterion.
So to begin, what is personal identity? Personal identity is usually defined as the continuousness of an entity’s identity. For example the identity of human A is indeed human, but to say its personal identity is ‘insert name’ is to say something quite different. By naming, or expressing what someone’s or something’s personal identity is we are describing them as an individual entity.
With the concept of a personal entity being a one-one (One person, one identity.) criteria comes the complication of what makes each entity explicitly its own and not a shared personal identity. In order to go into the details of how philosophers have attempted to deal with this problem, I first need to go into the theories which surround and try to express what it means to have personal identity.
The criteria for personal identity is commonly expressed as four separate components: that of bodily continuity, that of memory/psychological continuity, that of spatial continuity, and that of time continuity. Bodily continuity is: so long as you have your body then you’re you. So for example in the case of a brain transplant the bodily continuity of a person becomes confusing. Is the new body the person with the old brain in, or is the old empty body with no brain in you? Spatial continuity and bodily continuity go hand in hand as without a body you have no spatial existence and vice versa. While psychological continuity would assert that the new body with the old brain in would indeed be you because you have your tastes, your memories and personality stored in your brain, thus you’re psychologically still you and retain your identity. While time continuity is simply an entities’ continued existence in time with no breaks, or gaps as a continued being. (1) Each of these four criterion are more important depending on what you believe your personal identity to be. And with this I will go into the theories that use these criterion.
I will begin with psychological continuity. (2) This, as the name suggests, favours memory/psychological continuity. So long as you remember being you, and also remember being conscious of being you: you are you. The memory of a past action combined with the memory of the consciousness of the past stage makes it you that experienced it. (3) Thus retaining a continuity in your personal identity. (4) The problem with this is quite simple: one can remember what didn’t happen, and one can forget what did. There is a way that has been attempted to avoid this by saying that while you may not remember what you did as a child, you can remember something in your past, and that someone you were in the past could remember what you did as a child. While this makes perfect sense when we think back to our own experiences it also falls prey to the fact that one could forget everything they have ever done and would according to this theory no longer have the personal identity that makes them themselves. (5)
The psychological approach makes the distinction between bodily identity and personal identity. In this sense, to place a personal identity in another, similar body would retain the identity. (6) Although to say such a thing sounds strange. To have a psychology one must have a brain, and to have a brain one must have a body. To remove a brain and to place it in another is not to transfer yourself to another body, but to invade it; the body would not be yours but the brain and psychology would be. The psychological approach attempts to make a distinction between a bodily identity and personal identity while failing to see that a brain is a bodily identity as well as the container of a part of personal identity. So long as the brain remains, then the bodily continuity has been retained along with the psychological/memory. But, what the personal identity is has been cut down to a brain.
So what sense can we make of psychological/memory being the only thing needed to retain my personal identity? To change my body would be to change my personal identity. My personal identity is the manifestation and possibility of my bodily identity. If the new body my psychology is put into is similar but built in a way that makes music painful, in what sense would my personal identity as a musician be retained? Thus it seems that bodily identity is relational to personal identity as much as psychological/memory is. (7)
Let us imagine that a person is cloned, this person is A and the clone is B. A has had their memory and entire body cloned perfectly. The result is B. According to the psychological theory this would preserve the personal identity of A. Because B has the memories, body and relation to A, then B is A. It would have memory continuity, and in a sense would have bodily continuity. But it would not have spatial and time continuity that relates to A. Thus B is not A: A is A, and B is B. They are not the same personal identity. This is known as the non-branching psychological theory. Meaning that any entity that shares A’s memories and psychology, is a new personal identity by virtue that personal identity can only be one-one, and not shared across two or more entities. Although some philosophers disagree. (8) The psychological continuity criterion is inadequate by itself because the memories could be illusory, and the personal identity corrupt. (9) I will discuss this later on in this essay.
Moving on from this is the concept of bundle theory. (10) First lets consider whether the title ‘I’ can be considered as an attribute and property? If so then the first personness is the only unchanging thing about the personal identity of a subject. The problem with this view is pointed out by the bundle theory. Bundle theory is the idea put forward by David Hume (1711-1776) that the self is nothing but an illusion. We have experiences, and when these are linked together by memory, they form an illusion and concept of the self. To Hume the self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions that follow each other with such speed that we cannot help but think there is someone experiencing them in succession, like a viewer watching chapters of a film. (11) Hume asserts that there seems to be no self, just the experiences and perceptions exist. (12) Making the idea of personal identity somewhat absurd.
From this view of the bundle known as the self, comes the relationalist theory that there are only experiences stringed together by relation. (13) There is no core or I. (14) So what keeps the personal identity for a relationalist is that the bodily continuity has a continued relation, this includes relation of memories to each other. (15) So long as each experience has a relation to another and follows, remembered or not, then the personal identity is maintained. (16)
The relational theory relies on a personal identity in space. Meaning it must be manifested with a physical relation, and a physical existence exists within time. Thus the relational theory of personal identity can explain change, development and loses in personal identity without becoming absurd. A change in body can retain the personal identity by the relational connection between the events of being conscious in one body and then being conscious in another. This would no doubt impact on the future development of the personal identity, but in no way would this mean that there is no relation, thus it is the same (but progressed in time) personal identity via relation. But what of spatial relation? This has also changed when moving into a new body, but is still spatially related by the event of moving the personal identity into a new body. It seems that the relational theory has a much greater, and reasonable explanatory scope. This doesn’t necessarily make the theory correct. While it does certainly make it a practical theory to use to investigate personal identity.
In direct opposition to the idea that the personal identity is nothing but a relation between experiences with no real self is the substance theory. This view is attributed to Plato (429?–347 B.C.E.), and much later by Descartes (1596-1650). A substance theorist does believe there is a self, and it is not as simple as bodily, or psychological continuity. There is something within us which makes us ‘us’. There is a substance to unite all experience, rather than merely a relation between experiences. (17) Plato called this substance the soul. (18)
The problem with the substance theory is that we simply have no reason to accept it, just as we simply have no reason to accept the bundle theory. (19) While the substance theory wins us over in a common sensical way, and seems to relate to our life experience, that does not make it true. And while the bundle theory runs against our intuition and is hard to take seriously because of the way we think about ourselves, that does not make it true or false either. (20) Both need to be investigated, rather than pushed aside and not taken seriously.
John Locke (1632-1704) put forward an interesting thought experiment which brings substance theory’s personal identity into severe doubt. Imagine you’re on your death bed, your soul leaves your body and is replaced with another person’s soul. This other soul now has the same identity and memories as you, yet it is not the same person. (21) This argument makes personal identity via the substance theory somewhat incoherent. While according to the psychological, bodily, spatial and time criteria this most certainly is the same person. When it fits all four criteria it begins to look absurd to say that this person is not the same person. The substance theory relies on a personal identity existing in time alone; it can have a body, or a similar body to a past one, but what makes it the same identical person is its continuity through time. What sense can we make of an isolated personal identity that can exist with no body and only in time? Memory requires body. A time based personal identity cannot resolve this problem. This does not make substance identity untrue, but it does cripple it with severe doubt and a lack of common sense when further investigated in this way.
So, it seems the psychological/memory criterion is not enough to define personal identity, (22) nor is substance theory. (23) It can work better if it is synthesised with other criterion to build a holistic view of the personal identity of a particular entity. And the same can be said about bodily continuity. While problems with both the substance and bundle theory seem to be based on the fact their criteria alone (relational and substance) do not work. Substance theory has no reason to be believed other than intuition, and bundle theory has no reason to not be believed other than counter-intuitiveness. Personal identity is not bodily continuity, or memory continuity only. It is not spatial continuity either. Personal identity is holistic. (24) This leaves us with the disability of personal identity not being mereological, and also suffering the same problems of the numerical; that of exactly where do we draw the line once we begin to. The line must be drawn and I propose that personal identity is never truly removed until spatial continuity is ended, that is to say: death.
If spatial continuity is ended and then brought back, for example: person A is broken down into atoms and then remade, (25) then this new person A is not the original person A exactly because it has been remade and its spatial continuity ended. (26) New person A is indeed identical with original A, it is even made of the same atoms. But original person A is dead, while new person A is identical in all senses except spatial continuity: that is to say that new person A does not share the spatial continuity with original A, and is thus a separate entity and not the literal identical personal identity. If two things are identical they still are not via the spatial-temporal position of the two entities. They do not possess the identical spatial-temporal position, and thus are not identical or the same entity. A is identical to A. B is identical to B. A and B are not identical.
A person may lose their memory, remove body parts and traits, but so long as a spatial existence remains, the one entity that makes a person, retains its personal identity. While it continues to change, the entity is still retaining its personal identity. (27) This does indeed border on substance theory, but something physical must remain and be this substance. There must be something existing in order for the entity to retain its personal identity. And something physical has a spatial relation, location and continuity.
Although I must admit and conclude that no single criterion I can find is satisfactory, and even the spatial continuity theory has problems. (28) No single criterion can be enough when it comes to such a complex matter as personal identity. We can, and do, use practical criteria for personal identity everyday, and in our common experiences this does work for us. However, it is simply unsatisfactory as a metaphysical foundation.
1. ‘It is just this succession of different psychological attitudes toward the same event (first anticipation, then perception, then memory) together with the succession of the different experiences themselves that gives rise to the impression of time’s flow, and it is that impression that provides the basis for our different attitudes towards the future and the past.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 6, The passage of time. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Page 82.
2. ‘Locke thought that in the case of persons, it was memory, or psychological continuity, that was key to a person’s survival.’ – Stephen Mumford, Metaphysics: a very short introduction. Chapter 7, what is a person? Thanks for the memories. (Oxford university press, 2012.) Page 66.
3. ‘Connectedness involves a direct relation between the memory and the action or thought remembered. For example, I am memory connected to our conversation on time this morning, and this morning I was memory connected to my having gone to bed the night before. Now, however, I am not memory connected to my public school graduation. Since it happened so long ago I simply cannot remember it. Nevertheless, there is memory continuity between me now and me then; today I can remember what I did the day before and so on back to the day I graduated from public school. Thus, we should define the view in terms of memory continuity.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Pages 94-95.
4. ‘[T]he psychological approach emphasizes consciousness or, more accurately, self-consciousness, in its account of personal identity. On the psychological approach, what links a present stage of a person to a past stage of the same person is that the present stage contains a memory of the consciousness of the past stage. I can remember what you did yesterday in that I can remember having seen you do something in the past. What I cannot remember, however, is your experience or consciousness of having done that past action; only you can remember that. Only you can remember from the inside, from a first-person perspective, having done something in the past.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Page 93.
5. ‘[S]uppose a young student is fined for overdue library books. Later, as a middle-aged lawyer, she remembers paying the fine. Later still, in her dotage, she remembers her law career, but has entirely forgotten not only paying the fine but everything else she did in her youth. According to the memory criterion the young student is the middle-aged lawyer, the lawyer is the elderly woman, but the elderly woman is not the young student. This is an impossible result: if x and y are one and y and z are one, x and z cannot be two. Identity is transitive; memory continuity is not.’
– Article accessed on Wednesday 24th February, 3:02am:
Personal identity article – First published Tue Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Thu Jul 9, 2015. Section accessed:
6. ‘The psychological approach does not dispense with the body entirely. A person’s character could hardly be manifested if he or she didn’t have a body, and it is difficult to comprehend how a person could have memories without having a brain. However, while having a body or some body is, on any plausible version of the psychological view, necessary for personal identity, what is not necessary is that I have this particular body. Any body structurally similar would do. Thus, the psychological approach downplays the importance not of the body per se, but of bodily identity in matters of personal identity.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Pages 97-98.
7. ‘[T]here is no time when you could recall anything that happened to you while you dreamlessly slept last night. The memory criterion has the absurd implication that you have never existed at any time when you were unconscious. The person sleeping in your bed last night must have been someone else.’
– Article accessed on Wednesday 24th February, 3:02am:
Personal identity article – First published Tue Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Thu Jul 9, 2015. Section accessed:
8. ‘[A] person’s mental history need not be like a canal, with only one channel. It could be like a river, with islands, and with separate streams.’ – Derek Parfit, Personal identity taken from The Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Jan., 1971). Pages 3-27. Published by Duke university press on behalf of Philosophical Review.
Accessed on 23-02-2016 02:36 UTC.
9. ‘Locke’s memory criterion of personal identity is inadequate. We can distinguish between true and false memories where the false ones are in some way illusory. There are some cases where people hear stories so many times they start to believe that they witnessed them first hand when they didn’t. Purported memory is not enough.’ – Stephen Mumford, Metaphysics: a very short introduction. Chapter 7, what is a person? All in the mind? (Oxford university press, 2012.) page 74.
10. ‘Bundle theories take their name from the work of the philosopher David Hume (1711-76), who described how he stared into his own experiences looking for the experiencing self but all he ever found was the experiences. He concluded that the self is not an entity but is more like a ‘bundle of sensations’; one’s life is a series of impressions that seem to belong to one person but are really just tied together by memory and other such relationships.’ – Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: a very short introduction. Chapter 5, The self. (Oxford university press, 2005.) Page 67.
11. ‘[A] completely different approach is provided by Dennett. Having rejected the Cartesian theatre, he also rejects its audience of one who watches the show. The self, he claims, is something that needs to be explained, but it does not exist in the way that a physical object (or even a brain process) exists. Like a centre of gravity in physics, it is a useful abstraction. Indeed, he calls it a ‘centre of narrative gravity’. Our language spins the story of a self and so we come to believe that there is, in addition to our single body, a single inner self who has consciousness, holds opinions, and makes decisions. Really, there is no inner self but only multiple parallel processes that give rise to a benign user illusion – a useful fiction.’ – Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: a very short introduction. Chapter 5, The self. (Oxford university press, 2005.) Page 81.
12. ‘I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distance notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.’ – Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael, The great philosophers: From Socrates to Turing. Anthony Quinton: Hume. The self. (A Phoenix paperback, 2001.) Pages 243-244.
13. ‘[S]omething is a quality if and only if it stands in relations.’ – D.W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics. 6. Simple substances: monism and pluralism. Absolute idealism and logical atomism. (Cambridge university press. 1995 reprint of the 1984 original.) Page 119.
14. ‘On the relational view, on the other hand, the successive experiences that I have throughout my lifetime are not each related to an underlying substance or common unchanging constituent. Rather, when I judge that I am the same person today as I was yesterday, my judgment is true because the experience that I am having now and the experiences that I had yesterday fit together and are related in a way appropriate to constitute a single life.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Page 90.
15. ‘As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, it is to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never should have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person.’ – Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael, The great philosophers: From Socrates to Turing. Anthony Quinton: Hume. The self. (A Phoenix paperback, 2001.) Page 244.
16. ‘Wittgenstein gave us a nice image to think of here. The individual strands that constitute a rope go only so far through it. There is no single strand that goes from one end to the other. But through a series of overlapping parts, the rope manages to stretch from one end to another. Our psychological continuity must be like this.’ – Stephen Mumford, Metaphysics: a very short introduction. Chapter 7, what is a person? Thanks for the memories. (Oxford university press, 2012.) page 67.
17. ‘On the substance theory, there is a substance to anchor or unite all thoughts, experiences and emotions which belong to one person. Whereas on he relational view there is some kind of string that ties or relates the different temporal segments into the phases of one life.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Page 91.
18. ‘I have always been attracted to Plato’s answer to those questions. He thought that a person was composed of two parts: a physical or bodily part and a more fundamental immaterial or non-bodily part which he called the soul. He also maintained that the soul was the seat or subject of consciousness and the bearer of personal identity. Plato reasoned that my thoughts can change, my body can change and indeed, everything about me can change, but what is invariable is the inner me, what I am essentially, my soul. Thus, for Plato, our physical body has very little to do with our identity. Rather, on his view of personal identity, the unity or sameness of a life is founded upon the unity or sameness of the immaterial soul.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Page 88.
19. ‘Bundle theory is extraordinarily difficult to understand or to accept. It means completely throwing out any idea that you are an entity who has consciousness and free will, or who lives the life of this particular body. Instead, you have to accept that the word ‘self’, useful as it is, refers to nothing that is real or persisting; it is just an idea or a word. And as for the self who has experiences, this sort of self is just a fleeting impression that arises along with each experience and fades away again. The illusion of continuity occurs because each temporary self comes along with memories that give an impression of continuity.’ – Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: a very short introduction. Chapter 5, The self. (Oxford university press, 2005.) Pages 68-69.
20. ‘Would you press the button’ thought experiment that provokes the concept of self:
‘Would you press the button?
Do you believe in the existence of selves? Does your heart tell you one thing and your intellect another? This philosophers’ thought experiment is a good way to find out.
Imagine a machine that you can step inside and travel anywhere you wish to go. When you press the button, every cell of your body is scanned, destroyed, and recreated at your chosen destination. Since this is a thought experiment we must assume that the procedure is 100% safe and reversible. So you can have no legitimate fears about getting lost on the way. The question is – would you go?
If you are really a bundle theorist you should have no qualms at all. Every cell of your body will be just the same after the journey and all your memories will be intact. You will appear unchanged to everyone else, and you will have just the same illusion of an inner self as you had before.
If you still don’t want to press the button, you must be clinging onto the idea that it won’t really be ‘you’ who arrives. In other words, you still believe in an inner self.’ – Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: a very short introduction. Chapter 5, The self. (Oxford university press, 2005.) Pages 73-74.
21. ‘You are a succession of experiences, including thoughts, feelings, emotions and actions, and you continue by having those experiences related in the right way. As far as the soul is concerned, John Locke, whose views on personal identity provide the starting point for psychological theories, thought that there was a soul, but wondered if perhaps he didn’t have a different soul at every moment. He thought that even if he did change his soul he would still be who he is if he could remember who he was! Look at it this way. Suppose that I was on my deathbed and I died. Suppose that when I died my soul left and went to another place. Suppose further that a few minutes later a different soul (not my old soul) entered my body and I came alive again with the same body, same memories and same character as that which I had before I “died.” I would say that I came back from the dead, or that the person I was before my old soul left is the same person as I now am with this new soul. But then, the soul I have does not determine my identity.’ – Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. Part II, Time and Identity. Dialogue 7, Personal identity. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.) Page 94.
22. ‘In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. It will be incumbent on those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory.’ – Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael, The great philosophers: From Socrates to Turing. Anthony Quinton: Hume. The self. (A Phoenix paperback, 2001.) Page 244.
23. ‘[A]s Hume puts it, memory does not constitute, but discovers, personal identity.’ – Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael, The great philosophers: From Socrates to Turing. Anthony Quinton: Hume. The self. (A Phoenix paperback, 2001.) Page 242.
24. ‘Heraclitus said that one could not step into the same river twice, in the sense that the water of that river was constantly changing. However, that did not require that rivers should not be given a name or that one should be surprised to find it still flowing the next day. The river is a changing phenomenon, in the sense that its material is constantly flowing, but its formal identity remains.’ – Mel Thompson, Teach yourself: philosophy of mind. 05, personal identity and memory. Personal view. (Of the teach yourself series, http://www.teachyourself.com, 2003.) Page 99.
25. Reconstitution and teleportation examples:
– John Hospers, An introduction to philosophical analysis. 6, What am I? Mind and body. 3. Personal identity. When is it still you? Reconstitution. (Routledge, fourth edition, 2007.) Pages 192-193.
26. An argument for identity being impossible to share over two entities:
– Michael J. Loux. Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction. Chapter 3, Concrete particulars I – Substrata, bundles, and substances. Another objection to the bundle theory – the Identity of Indiscernibles. (Routledge, 1998.) Pages 109-110.
27. ‘We believe not only that things persist through time, but also that they change over time. Accordingly, we believe that familiar objects persist through change.’ – Michael J. Loux. Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction. Chapter 6, Concrete particulars II – Persistence through time. An argument for perdurantism – change in properties. (Routledge, 1998.) Page 218.
28. For more examples of thought experiments that throw personal identity into yet more problems:
– Bernard Williams, The self and the Future taken from The philosophical review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Apr., 1970). Pages 161-180. Published by Duke university press on behalf of Philosophical Review.
Accessed on 23-02-2016 02:36 UTC.
– Blackmore, Susan. Consciousness: a very short introduction. (Oxford university press, 2005.)
– Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness explained. (1991.)
– Descartes, René. Meditations on first philosophy. (1641.)
– Hamlyn, D.W.. Metaphysics. (Cambridge university press. 1995 reprint of the 1984 original.)
– Hospers, John. An introduction to philosophical analysis. (Routledge, fourth edition, 2007.)
– Hume, David. Treatise of human nature. (1738.)
– Hume, David. Enquiry concerning human understanding. (1748.)
– Locke, John. Essay concerning human understanding. (1689.)
– Loux, Michael J.. Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction. (Routledge, 1998.)
– Monk, Ray & Raphael, Frederic. The great philosophers: From Socrates to Turing. (A Phoenix paperback, 2001.)
– Mumford, Stephen. Metaphysics: a very short introduction. (Oxford university press, 2012.)
– Plato. Phaedo.
– Smith, Quentin & Oaklander, L. Nathan. Time, Change and Freedom: an introduction to metaphysics. (Routledge, 1999 reprint of the 1995 first publication.)
– Thompson, Mel. Teach yourself: Philosophy of mind. (Of the teach yourself series, http://www.teachyourself.com, 2003.)